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Abstract | This paper analyzes the personal political beliefs of John Foster Dulles which 
were defined by his Christian faith and anti-communist convictions. It illuminates the 
significance of Dulles’s belief system relative to his influence in stimulating relations 
between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan after World War II. Dulles, who had 
personal experience of Chinese politics and international relations, envisioned a 
regional order in East Asia centered on Japan following the 1949 communist revolution 
in China. Although he considered Japan the most important state in the region, he 
advocated for aid to the ROK as it was also part of the regional bloc of pro-US countries. 
Dulles’s emphasis on a proactive role in East Asia was consistent with the US approach 
to international affairs that was dominant in the late nineteenth century. This paper 
draws on resources such as Dulles’s book War or Peace, to measure the influence of his 
religious faith and his relative concern with colonialism and communism. While he 
contributed to the formation of stable relations between the ROK and Japan as sovereign 
states, Dulles was also responsible for the continued projection of the legacy of Japanese 
colonization on bilateral relations between the two nations.
Keywords | John Foster Dulles, ROK-Japan relations, Treaty of Versailles, San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, War or Peace
Introduction
No person can singlehandedly change the course of world politics. Yet individuals, 
through their judgment and contributions, can affect how international political 
events unfold. The ideological conflicts that exist at an individual level within 
the international political arena require analysis relative to the context of 
international political history. Examining the ideas of significant individuals 
provides us with information to understand historical development at a regional 
level, and the formation of relations between countries. Thus, the study of 
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significant individuals could be considered a basic research task of international 
politics.
This article contemplates the influence the personal beliefs of John Foster 
Dulles had on his diplomatic activities, convictions that were rooted in his 
religious faith and anti-communist sentiment. Specifically, this paper seeks to 
trace the formation and expression of his beliefs as they pertained to the 
formation of political relations to the between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
Japan following the end of World War II in 1945.
The dominant systems of belief within a given country exert influence in a 
variety of ways including how the nation approaches international relations, the 
scope of available foreign policy options, and the relative unity of its citizenry in 
supporting such choices (Jensen 1982, 72-75). The dominant belief systems 
within a state primarily derive from those of the citizenry. Beliefs, however, are 
not something that plays out in a systematic process or a fixed structure. Instead, 
they are created and recreated through accumulated experience and influenced 
by a range of factors such as education and empirical observation. Personal 
belief systems serve to sustain core notions of personhood, and can become 
further consolidated when they are combined with transcendental spiritual 
convictions such as religious faith.
Dulles was appointed Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Asia Policy 
and assigned the task of negotiating the San Francisco Peace Treaty in April 
1950 by President Harry S. Truman. As the architect of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and 
Japan, both signed on September 8, 1951, Dulles’s beliefs and actions had a 
profound impact on post-war US-Japan relations and Japanese foreign policy. 
Therefore, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US-Japan relations can be called 
“the world of John Foster Dulles” or “the world that Dulles built” (Calder 2009, 
27). The San Francisco peace system which formed with the completion of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty provided a crucial schema of the global Cold War 
order. This peace system not only served as the foundation of ROK-Japan 
relations during the Cold War but continues to regulate East Asia today.
This article focuses on Dulles’s personal political and religious ideology and 
the formation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as a key event that defined the 
historical trajectory of ROK-Japan relations. It also seeks to illuminate the 
relationship between Dulles’s role in early ROK-Japan relations by examining 
those individuals around Dulles who impacted his beliefs, and the ideological 
influence of the long tradition of US international policy since the late 
nineteenth century. This exegesis of Dulles’s beliefs is historically important as 
he was so influential in shaping the postwar international political landscape, 
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not just in East Asia, but also in Europe and the US.  
This article, which looks at Dulles’s life from his early years through to the 
signing of the San Francisco Peace treaty in 1951, bases its analysis on Dulles’s 
book War or Peace. As this work was written by Dulles himself it is an important 
primary source. While not exactly a memoir, the book includes many personal 
recollections, and represents the writer’s stated and considered perception of 
these important historical events at the time of the book’s publication. Most 
importantly, War or Peace offers an important source to help us understand 
Dulles’s beliefs just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the 
signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 as it was published shortly 
before these major events.1 
Early Foreign Policy Experience and the Treaty of Versailles
Born in the US in 1888, most of Dulles’s career was involved in US foreign 
policy and European affairs. While Dulles was largely ignorant of East Asia, he 
did have a few direct and indirect experiences with the region. Important in this 
context was his maternal grandfather John Watson Foster, whom Dulles was 
named after.2 
Foster served as the US ambassador to Mexico, Russia, and Spain, and then 
as the Secretary of State for the Benjamin Harrison administration from June 
1892 to February 1893. In addition, he served as a political adviser to Li Hongzhang, 
the Qing representative at the peace negotiations to end the First Sino-Japanese 
War in Shimonoseki in 1895, and had a hand in mediating the conditions of the 
peace treaty. John Watson Foster recognized the importance of the Chinese 
market prior to the initiation of the US “Open Door Policy” in 1899. However, 
instead of seeking to gain a monopoly for American influence, he thought it 
best to maintain a balance among the great powers while securing space for 
1. War or Peace was first published in early 1950 and a revised edition was published in 1957. 
2. Dulles’s family history has some notable characteristics. Several members of the family served in 
the foreign service and government. Foster, Dulles, and Foster’s son-in-law and Dulles’s uncle 
Robert Lansing all served as Secretary of State. Dulles’s little brother Allen Welsh Dulles was the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961, and Eleanor Lansing Dulles 
also served in the State Department. Second, several members of the family had legal backgrounds. 
Foster, Lansing, Dulles, and Allen Dulles all spent time at Sullivan & Cromwell, a firm specializing 
in international law, gaining experience and learning about legal ideas. Third, Dulles’s grandfather 
and father were pastors. Dulles’s father Allen Macy Dulles was a pastor in the Northern 
Presbyterian Church. Dulles’s son Avery Dulles also studied theology in the Catholic Church and 
became a cardinal in 2001.
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American intervention and simultaneously preventing Japanese hegemony. 
Foster thus paved the way for US commercial and trade interests in China.
Foster published his memoirs, War Stories for My Grandchildren, in 1918. 
These included descriptions of the American Civil War, and as the title indicates 
the book sought to convey to his grandchildren the impact of war and the 
message of his life. Due to such concerns, Foster maintained a close relationship 
with his grandchildren and Dulles read his grandfather’s book American 
Diplomacy in the Orient in 1903. With a shortage of expert research on East Asia 
in the US during the early twentieth century, this writing received attention and 
commensurate prestige (Reed 1983, 92). In his work, Foster highlighted the role 
the US should take in tutoring Korea, Japan, Qing China, and other East Asian 
states.
It has been seen that whenever the American representatives have approached 
the governments of China, Japan, Korea, and Siam, it was with the statement that 
their far-away people cherish no scheme of territorial aggrandizement in that 
region of the world, and that their only desire was to secure mutual benefit from 
the establishment of trade and to extend the influence of Christian civilization. 
(Foster 1903, 399) 
 The American Union has become an Asiatic power. It has new duties to 
discharge and enlarged interests to protect… Its task will be well done if it shall 
aid in giving to the world a freer market, and to the inhabitants of the Orient the 
blessings of Christian civilization. (Foster 1903, 438)
Foster wished to see Western international law applied to East Asia. He 
thought it important that America enter the East Asian sphere and play a role in 
spreading Christianity to the region. For Foster, both of these things would 
benefit Asia and thus justify American intervention. Furthermore, Foster 
studied the historical changes in the Monroe Doctrine in a book he wrote on US 
foreign policy in 1900. In this he argued that the Doctrine contributed to peace 
and stability as it invoked the right of self-defense under international law 
(Foster 1900, 445-56).3 
3. Rhee Syngman identified with Foster’s arguments. Rhee cited Foster’s book in the conclusion of 
his own work entitled Neutrality As Influenced by the US which was published in 1912 and also 
served as his doctoral dissertation. Rhee (1912, 104) pointed out the following in his writings: “The 
declaration of the independence of the US in 1776 marks the introduction of a new era in the 
history of the laws of neutrality. ‘From the beginning of its political existence,’ says John W. Foster, 
‘it [the US] made itself the champion of a free commerce, of a sincere and genuine neutrality, of 
respect of private property in war, of the most advanced ideas of natural rights and justice; and in 
its brief existence, by its persistent advocacy, it has exerted a greater influence in the recognition of 
these elevated principles than any other nation in the world.’ The most important questions, the 
settlement of which was largely influenced by the United States, were (1) the recognition of 
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Dulles’s foreign policy career began in 1907 at the Second Hague Peace 
Conference which was held at the suggestion of the US. Foster participated in 
the conference while Dulles served as his assistant. The reason Foster had Dulles 
accompany him was that Dulles had a good command of the French language 
which was then used as the international language of diplomacy (Foster 1909, 
212). Foster also arranged for Dulles to do some interpretation and protocol 
work for the Qing delegation (Beal 1957, 47).  
It was suggested at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 that a third 
conference be held in 1915, but that conference never took place given that 
World War I broke out in 1914. Instead, following the armistice agreed upon by 
Germany and the Allies on November 11, 1918, the Paris Peace Conference began 
on January 18, 1919, and presented a chance to end the war and create a new 
peace. The conference ran for over six months until June 28, and while much 
energy was spent defining the extent of Germany’s responsibility and the 
amount of reparations to be paid, the conference also considered the issues of 
national self-determination, territorial dispute, and the foundation of the 
League of Nations, alongside various other questions. 
In his Fourteen Points speech of January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson 
highlighted the importance of reviving the countries victimized by the war, 
implicitly arguing that Germany should be responsible for paying reparations. 
Yet while discussing the peace conference in the American Capitol Building on 
February 11, Wilson said that the peace conference will not enforce territorial 
annexation, reparations, or punitive policies on Germany and Austria-Hungary 
(Wilson 2012, 475). 
Ultimately the Allies did demand Germany pay reparations, and the concluding 
Treaty of Versailles is now known for its severity. The treaty itself, from the 
choice of Versailles as the location for the signing to the punitive nature of the 
reparations, left the Germans bitter and vindictive. During the Franco-Prussian 
War (1870-71), the Prussian forces overwhelmed the French, and Wilhelm I 
proclaimed a united German empire and held his coronation at the Palace of 
Versailles. For this and many other reasons, it was clear that the relationship 
between the victor and vanquished of the previous war was not unrelated to the 
circumstance of the proceeding conflict. As such, while the US led the writing 
of the Treaty, the final product substantially reflected the will of the French, 
with, for instance, article 227 of the Treaty calling for Wilhelm II to be put on 
independence, (2) the inviolability of neutral jurisdiction, and (3) the freedom of neutral 
commerce.” Moreover, Rhee (64) thought that the Monroe Doctrine “clearly defined the neutral 
position of the United States.” However, the Monroe Doctrine according to Foster, as seen above, 
put peace and stability first.  
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trial. The most well-known clause of the Treaty of Versailles is Article 231. 
Typically known as the “War Guilt Clause,” it declared that Germany and its 
allies were legally responsible for all of the loss and damage inflicted on the 
Allies and the people of the Allied countries. Notwithstanding that Article 231 
did not set a specific amount of reparations to be paid, the American position, 
represented by Wilson, had originally only considered demanding compensation 
for illegal actions during the war.
Dulles contributed to early drafts of this reparations provision. With his 
experience as a lawyer, Dulles was a consultant to the Reparations Commission 
and a member of the Supreme Economic Council. In the version of the reparations 
clause that Dulles wrote on February 21, he specified Germany’s responsibility 
for the losses of civilians and included a moral dimension in addition to the 
legal basis for their responsibility (Henig 1995, 21). Dulles’s arguments were 
supported by Norman Davis who served as the Financial Commissioner for the 
US delegation. Davis felt that all moral and legal responsibility for the war and 
the results of the war, including the loss of property by the nations and people of 
the Allies, fell upon Germany. This became the basis of Article 231 (Sharp 2008, 
90-91). 
Most research on the Versailles’ reparations mentions the role of John 
Maynard Keynes. He had attended the peace conference as a member of the 
British delegation and he expressed his concerns about the Allies’ demands for 
severe punitive reparations from Germany in The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace, published in December 1919. He made it clear that “my purpose in this 
book is to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not practically right or possible” 
(Keynes 2009, 27). He argued that it was not that Germany was free of respon- 
sibility for World War I, but that he was concerned that the financial burden 
placed on Germany was too great and the scope of the reparations too wide 
(Markwell 1995, 190-91). Keynes (2009, 21) stated, “It was the task of the Peace 
Conference to honor engagements and to satisfy justice; but not less to re- 
establish life and to heal wounds. These tasks were dictated as much by prudence 
as by the magnanimity which the wisdom of antiquity approved in victors.”
The official American position on this argument was given in 1920 by 
Bernard Baruch in The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the 
Treaty. It was a refutation of Keynes and other critics of the Treaty of Versailles. 
While Baruch was nominally the author of the book, it was ghost written by 
officials who were involved in the Paris Peace Conference. Dulles’s views took 
up a significant portion of the book (Pruessen 1982, 516), and it has been argued 
that this work is best seen as having been written by Dulles himself (Keylor 
1998, 487). In the book’s preface, it was acknowledged that all of Wilson’s hopes 
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were not included in the Treaty of Versailles, but it argued that Wilson was able 
to achieve his goal of suppressing and minimizing vengefulness in the treaty 
(Baruch 2007, 6).   
While the Treaty of Versailles did not specify an amount of reparations to be 
paid, it did stipulate the legal standards that framed Germany’s responsibility for 
the war and the principle that compensation should be paid. For Davis and 
Dulles, who provided the original draft of the “War Guilt Clause,” the moral 
problem regarding Germany was clear solely because Germany had started the 
war (Schwabe 1985, 246).4 As a lawyer, Dulles felt the reparations clause proved 
Germany’s responsibility and that, on the whole, the Treaty of Versailles was fair 
(Guhin 1972, 30; MacMillan 2002, 193).
Fusion of Christian Faith and Anti-communism
The year 1945 is a turning point at which a line can be drawn at the end of World 
War II to delineate the inception of the postwar period. Such turning points 
tend to highlight the ruptures rather than continuities in the basic structures that 
define the two epochs. The beginning of the Cold War is commonly seen as being 
defined by the split between the US and Soviet Union, the former allies, 
following the end of World War II. Generally, the Cold War is considered as a 
conflict between the US and Soviet Union who were the leading states within 
two opposing ideological, military, and territorial blocs. Yet when we interpret 
the Cold War as an ideological contest between communism and capitalism, it 
allows us to reconsider the origins of this global political struggle for postwar 
hegemony through the emergence of a new “Russian” state ideology that 
sprouted in 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution. The subsequent new Soviet 
Republic was created through a revolutionary socialist dictatorship, the 
concerns of which directly contrasted the “liberal spirit” of free enterprise and 
individualism that the ruling elite of the US used to define their society 
(Fleming 1968, 3). The Cold War was a clash of ideologies, but it was also a clash 
between the people who espoused those ideologies. In this respect it is helpful to 
view the conflictual and competitive perceptions of Woodrow Wilson and 
Vladimir Lenin through the lens of political science which highlights the 
structures and forms of power both were disposed to (Mayer 1959; Williams 
4. Dulles was surprised that by 1940 Article 231 was being regarded as the “War Guilt Clause” 
(Keylor 1998, 501). This can be taken as Dulles’s refusal to admit a relationship between Article 231 
of the Treaty of Versailles and the outbreak of World War II in 1939 following Germany’s invasion 
of Poland. 
50  KIM Soongbae
1971). In short, while the use of the phrase “Cold War” came into popular use 
after the end of World War II, the US hostility towards communism began well 
before 1945.
The first chapter of Dulles’s 1950 book War or Peace is entitled “The Danger.” 
While World War II was over, Dulles was conscious of a new situation in which 
war may arise due to the competition between the new dominant “free” bloc of 
the West and the “communist” Eastern bloc. While Dulles felt that war could be 
avoided and did not believe that such was impending, he did have several views 
on this hypothetical conflict. First, the crisis of conflict has to be observed 
exactly as it is. Second, all Americans need to understand and support existing 
policies. Third, at the same time, some policies are inadequate and need to be 
supplemented. Fourth, Dulles argued for the need to cultivate spiritual power, 
arguing that the US needed to make a “sustained effort for peace” if it were to 
overcome the Russian (Soviet) “creed that teaches world domination and that 
would deny those personal freedoms which constitute our most cherished 
political and religious heritage” (Dulles 1950, 2-4). In Chapter 2, entitled “Know 
Your Enemy,” Dulles criticizes the perceptions of Joseph Stalin as laid out in his 
book Problems of Leninism and the atheism of Soviet communism. In Chapter 3 
“The Goal,” Dulles, taking a pacifist stance, disavows the use of force to reach a 
settlement and defines peace as “a condition where international changes can be 
made peacefully” (19). Dulles thus contrasts his own peaceful philosophy and 
objectives with the violence of communism. He also criticizes those who believe 
that “Soviet communism has changed; that it no longer seeks world conquest 
and no longer uses methods of fraud, secret penetration, and civil violence” (14). 
In this work, Dulles’s consistent argument is that faith is important and he 
highlights this again in Chapter 21, “Our Spiritual Need,” as well as the 
concluding Chapter 22. According to Dulles, the US needs to maintain a basis in 
religion, and it was this Christian faith that made the country great.    
Our nation was founded as an experiment in human liberty. Its institutions 
reflected the belief of our founders that men had their origin and destiny in God; 
that they were endowed by Him with inalienable rights and had duties prescribed 
by moral law, and that human institutions ought primarily to help men develop 
their God-given possibilities. (Dulles 1950, 254)
Dulles’s Christian faith was congruent with the foreign policy traditions of 
the US. From the 1760s, politicians such as Benjamin Franklin and John Adams 
had espoused the idea that the US was a superior nation built with the blessing 
of God. Such ideas gave rise to the notion of a national “manifest destiny” in 
1845. This ideological directive that America’s destiny was ordained by God 
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reflected the particular influence of religion in shaping expansionist US policy, 
and justified the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the annexation of Hawaii. 
Manifest destiny was also interrelated with the Monroe Doctrine, a foreign 
policy approach developed by John Quincy Adams and pronounced publicly on 
December 2, 1823, by President James Monroe during his State of the Union 
Address. Then on the same date in 1845, President James Polk first used the 
term “manifest destiny” during his State of the Union Address, and proceeded to 
say that the Monroe Doctrine remained a fundamental principle guiding US 
foreign policy (Haynes 1997, 115-45). 
Dulles inherited the traditional mantle of US foreign policy. However, the 
American approach espousing neutrality and anti-interventionist sentiment was 
increasingly challenged in the twentieth century by the rise of communism. 
Following the fruition of this ideological conflict into a full-blown global Cold 
War, War or Peace, published in 1950, was concerned with communism from 
beginning to end. Dulles was worried that, compared to its increasing material 
strength, America’s spiritual power was weak. For Dulles, material strength 
referred to economic and military power, and this point was aimed to make a 
contrast with the Soviet Union which had assumed itself to offer substantive 
material progress for the masses.5
The materialistic, irreligious society, which denies the existence of God or of a 
moral law, cannot depend upon love of God and love of neighbor. It must depend 
on governmental compulsion rather than on voluntary controls. … As a nation, 
although still religious, we have lost the connection between our religious faith 
and our practices. … Once the connection between faith and works is broken, we 
can no longer generate a spiritual power that will flow throughout the world. 
(Dulles 1950, 259)  
To break with this situation, Dulles argued the following:
We can, and must, reject totally the Marxian thesis that material things are 
primary and spiritual things only secondary. Slavery and despotism, even if they 
seem expedient, can never be right. We must not be afraid to recapture faith in 
the primacy of human liberty and freedom, and to hold to the religious view that 
man is destined by God to be more than a material producer, and that his chief 
end is something more than physical security. (Dulles 1950, 259)  
Dulles defined the communist powers as “the enemy,” “materialistic,” and 
5. Dulles cites the following words of Stalin: “The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism lies 
in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the needs of the development of the material 
life of society” (Dulles 1950, 257).
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“atheist.” America on the contrary needed to strengthen its communal, “spiritual,” 
and “religious” aspects. Dulles wrote War or Peace based on his own experiences 
making foreign policy and while expecting to be appointed Secretary of State 
(Beal 1957, 20). It is likely that Dulles’s clear-cut dichotomy between the 
American and Soviet ways of life was designed to attract a wider audience to his 
work. In conclusion, Dulles had this to say about “beliefs”:
Our greatest need is to regain confidence in our spiritual heritage. Religious 
belief in the moral nature and possibilities of man is, and must be, relevant to 
every kind of society, throughout the ages past and those to come. It is relevant to 
the complex conditions of modern society. We need to see that, if we are to 
combat successfully the methods and practices of a materialistic belief. (Dulles 
1950, 261) 
Wilson and Lenin who had embodied the ideologies of their respective 
countries died in 1924. Their deaths ended their confrontation, but Lenin’s 
successor, Stalin, was rising. In a way, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who sought to 
develop Wilson’s League of Nations idea into the United Nations, was Wilson’s 
successor as president. However, it would be more appropriate to label Dulles as 
Wilson’s ideological successor. Wilson, who was the greatest contributor to the 
birth of the Versailles peace system which was formed by the Treaty of Versailles, 
wrote a short essay entitled “The Road Away from Revolution” in 1923. With 
communism having grown stronger since the end of the signing of the treaty in 
1919, Wilson believed that the Bolshevik Revolution was essentially a refutation 
of capitalist society and that capitalism had not yet made the world safe from 
that materialistic revolution.6   
Dulles inherited from Wilson this desire to guard capitalist society against 
communism. He bought into Wilson’s ideology of caution, and further 
reproduced it. Dulles entered Princeton University in 1904 and majored in 
philosophy, but he was also interested in political life and took a class on 
American politics taught by Wilson who was visiting the university at the time 
(Pruessen 1982, 9-13). In War or Peace, Dulles notes that Wilson, in his 1923 
essay, saw the danger imminent in the revolutionary principles of communism. 
Dulles quoted verbatim the following passage written by Wilson: 
The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive 
materially unless it be redeemed spiritually. … Here is the final challenge to our 
churches, to our political organizations, and to our capitalists—to everyone who 
fears God or loves his country. (Dulles 1950, 261)
6. Wilson’s essay was modified and published in 1924 in The Atlantic Monthly. 
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The religiosity of Dulles’s anti-communist perspective resonated with 
Korean Christians as well as Americans. Following Dulles’s death in 1959, an 
article entitled “The Death of Dulles” was published in the Korean language 
publication Christian Thought (Kidokkyo sasang). Here it was argued that Dulles 
was not just seeking peace for Americans, but peace for all of humanity. It also 
evaluated Dulles’s life by citing the following words of his: 
What we have to do is this: American preachers, doctors, educators, and 
tradespeople must reclaim the spirit of the crusaders and take the wealth of their 
experiences to all corners of the globe. (Pak Ch’ang-hwan 1959, 7)
The article would go on to say that Koreans and all people needed to learn 
from Dulles’s convictions and carry on the work that he left behind (Pak Ch’ang-
hwan 1959, 8). Although the author never uses the words communism or anti-
communism owing to the fact that it focused on Dulles’s religious faith, if we 
consider the anti-communist sentiment that was prevalent in Korean Protestant 
communities at the time, then the article can be considered as a memorial, 
lamenting the loss of an international figurehead whose work and words 
embodied both Christianity and an anti-communism.7 
The idea that God “himself ” was protecting the manifest destiny of America 
was one of the foundational ideas of US foreign policy, and Dulles succeeded 
directly in this tradition. Dulles’s faith, which both enabled and compelled him 
to stand against Soviet atheist communists, became even more solidified with 
the times in which Dulles found himself. He considered himself a guardian of 
the traditional US approach to foreign policy, and he arrived on the stage during 
the Cold War as an ardent anti-communist. 
The Birth of Republic of Korea and the Origins of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty
1. The International Birth of the Republic of Korea
After the US-Soviet Joint Commission broke down in October 1947, the US 
turned the Korea question over to the United Nations (UN). On November 14, 
1947, the UN General Assembly adopted UN Resolution 112 (II) entitled “The 
Problem of the Independence of Korea” which called for elections to be held in 
7. Korean Protestants were in harmony with and supported US policies. They stood opposite to 
communism (Kang Wi-jo 2005, 123-24). 
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South Korea. The election was held on May 10, 1948 under the supervision of 
the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). The constitution was 
enacted on July 17, 1948 in South Korea and on August 15 the ROK was founded. 
Rhee Syngman, the first president of the ROK, sent a delegation headed by 
Chang Myŏn to the Third Meeting of the UN General Assembly in Paris to 
secure international recognition for the new country.
Rhee also appointed Cho Byŏng-ok as special representative of the president 
and sent him to several countries to ask for support to garner international 
approval for the ROK. Cho appointed Kim U-p’yŏng and Chŏng Il-hyŏng to his 
delegation and made Kim Chun-ku his personal assistant. Cho and his delegation 
visited Japan, China, the Philippines, the US, Canada, the UK, and other 
countries before meeting the other members of the Korean delegation, including 
Chang Myŏn, Chang Ki-yŏng, Chŏn Kyu-hong, Kim Hwal-ran, and others, in 
Paris (Cho Byŏng-ok 2003, 225).8 During the Third Session of the UN General 
Assembly at Palais de Chaillot, by a vote of forty-eight to six (three “no” votes 
from the Soviet Union and one each from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Yugoslavia) with one abstention (Sweden), UN Resolution 195 (III) on the question 
of Korean independence was passed on December 12, 1948, thus extending 
international recognition to the ROK.   
Behind the ROK’s successful bid for international recognition was the hard 
work of the Korean delegation buttressed by solid American support. In this 
effort Dulles played no small role. He was a US representative at UN General 
Assembly from 1946 to 1949, and in 1948 was the head of the US delegation 
(Biographical Directory of the US Congress n.d.). The significance of his assistance 
was such that when Dulles passed away in 1959, Cho Byŏng-ok recalled the 
following in regards to the fierce struggle for the ROK’s international recognition:
Korea owes Dulles a debt of gratitude. … The resolution on recognizing Korea’s 
independence was introduced just four days before the closing of the UN 
General Assembly session, and the communist bloc fell in line behind the Soviet 
representative [Andrei] Vyshinsky to block the proceedings and deny recognition 
of the ROK. Dulles then emphasized, during a UN Political Committee meeting, 
that the communist bloc representatives should stop their “filibuster” of the 
proceedings as “the passing of the resolution on the problem of the independence 
of Korea was one of the most important missions of this session of the General 
Assembly.” (Cho Byŏng-ok 1959)  
Dulles is therefore not only connected to ROK security as the signer of the 
8. Mo Yun-suk was also a member of the ROK delegation. 
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1953 US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty but was also involved in the ROK’s 
endeavor to garner international recognition in 1948. Chang Myŏn even referred to 
Dulles as the ROK’s savior.9
Dulles even mentioned this moment of international recognition for the 
ROK in his book War or Peace. Clearly exposing the structure of conflict 
between the “free” West and “communist” Eastern bloc during this era, Dulles 
explains that it was decided at the Cairo Conference of 1943 that Korea would 
receive its independence “in due course,” and there was an informal agreement 
at Yalta in 1945 that the nation would go through an interim period of 
trusteeship. However, things did not go as planned. Dulles goes on to explain 
the situation in the following manner:
The United Nations commission went to Korea and received full opportunity to 
conduct its investigations in the South. It was not, however, allowed to set foot in 
the Soviet zone of North Korea. Since South Korea formed about two-thirds of 
the country, both in area and in population, and since conditions there permitted 
a free and fair election, elections were held. A high percentage of the population 
voted, after a vigorous electoral campaign. The United Nations Assembly found 
that the resulting government was a “lawful government” and the “only” such 
government. That verdict was given on December 12, 1948, by a vote of 48 to 6. 
(Dulles 1950, 47-48)  
The emphasis of “lawful government” and “only” in the passage above was 
placed there by Dulles himself. On US’s Korea policy, Dulles held the following 
position: 
In South Korea we have responsibilities due to the fact that we were in occupation 
of that area and primarily sponsored its transition to independence. … But there 
is continuing need of economic support and of some military aid, if this young 
nation which we helped bring into the world is to survive. (Dulles 1950, 231)
While Dulles mentions the need for US support to be given to the ROK, he 
was unequivocal in his position that the most important nation in the region 
was Japan. Dulles argued that the traditional foundation of US’s Asia policy had 
been friendly relations with China, however, since China had become an ally of 
the Soviet Union it was time to transition US policy in the region (Dulles 1950, 
176). According to him, although the US had based its Asia policy on China by 
sending missionaries, doctors, and educators to the country, the communist 
9. Following Dulles’s death on May 24, 1959, Chang Myŏn (1959a, 1959b) published a eulogy of 
Dulles on June 1.
56  KIM Soongbae
revolution in China signaled that it was time for a strategic change (224). Dulles 
thought that the particular characteristics of Asian religions and culture should 
be recognized. For example, although Asians were not Christians, their strong 
religious adherence to Buddhism and Shintoism was equally incompatible with 
the materialism or atheism of communism. For Dulles, who believed that a 
faith-based policy of cooperation between the US and Asia was therefore possible, 
Japan was the logical choice to become the geopolitical center of US Asia policy.  
Already the United States has special responsibilities towards certain Eastern 
countries which it must make good. In doing so, it can set an example which will 
be influential throughout Asia and the Pacific, and can recapture some of its lost 
prestige. 
 Our particular opportunity and responsibility in that respect is Japan. We can, 
if we will, help Japan to be an exhibit in Asia of what a free society can develop in 
spiritual and intellectual richness and material well-being. … If we can help the 
Japanese to satisfy their needs, material and spiritual, that of itself will exert an 
influence throughout Asia and the Pacific. (Dulles 1950, 230)
Thus, with the end of World War II, US strategy in Asia shifted from China 
to Japan.
   
2. The Birth of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
Dulles believed the responsibility for World War I lay with Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and for World War II with Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Shōwa Emperor 
Hirohito, and noted that while initially all these aggressors had succeeded 
militarily, they were eventually defeated (Dulles 1950, 240). While Dulles does 
not mention it in his book, Kaiser Wilhelm II was not put on trial after seeking 
asylum in the Netherlands, Hitler committed suicide before World War II 
ended, and Mussolini was executed by partisans in Italy. However, Hirohito, 
who was responsible for the outbreak of the Pacific War, was spared to protect 
the national essence (kokutai) by Japanese politicians and in accordance with US 
foreign policy objectives. Dulles attended the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) meeting in Geneva in 1939 as a US representative and advocated for 
achieving world peace through the church. He was the chairperson of the Just 
and Durable Peace Committee which was founded by the WCC. Dulles at this 
time noted that Germany and Japan were countries taken over by “evil faiths” 
(Dulles 1942, 7), but with the intensification of the Cold War he came to support 
the rebirth of Japan relative to its established tradition of imperial spiritual 
leadership. By 1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also 
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known as the Tokyo Trials) had ended, and by 1951 the possibility of including a 
clear statement noting that the responsibility for the Pacific War lay with Hirohito 
was thin.
Unlike the Treaty of Versailles, the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not charge 
the heads of state with responsibility for the war, but, also unlike the Treaty of 
Versailles, the leaders of the war were put on trial. In Article 11 of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, Japan accepted the Tokyo Trials. Yet while Article 14 acknowledged 
that Japan should pay reparations, it also stated that Japan lacked sufficient 
capacity to meet obligations to pay such reparations if it were to also “maintain a 
viable economy.” As a result, the San Francisco Peace Treaty is often considered 
a “generous peace treaty” compared to the Treaty of Versailles in large part thanks 
to the difference in the reparations cause.
Dulles clearly had memories of the Treaty of Versailles. Regarding this, he 
thought that while securing compensation for the costs of war should be a 
priority, demanding excessive reparations from an opponent might result in the 
creation of a further desire for retribution on the part of the defeated. He also 
believed that with the US preparing a mutual defense treaty with Japan, 
demands for extreme reparations from an alliance partner would create tension 
(Miyasato 1990, 193-94). For Dulles, ever the anti-communist, the most important 
aspect of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was ultimately to secure the defense 
treaty that would ensure the presence of US military bases in Japan.  
Dulles expressed his views on Japanese reparations in a speech he gave on 
March 31, 1951 at Whittier College in California (Scheiber 2002). He believed 
that it was justified to demand reparations from Japan for the damage inflicted 
by the war, but he also insisted that reparations were not simply about justice 
and must be deemed viable and avoid devastating the domestic economy. He 
was convinced that, if Japan becomes a member of the “free world” through the 
conclusion of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, then it could also become 
economically self-reliant. Therefore, the peace treaty with Japan must bring 
about a “peace of trust.” Having witnessed the violence of communism during 
the unfolding of the Korean War, Dulles had become increasingly pragmatic in 
his anti-communist mission. Therefore, while the UK was skeptical of the US 
position to seek a lenient peace during the drafting of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, Dulles emphasized Article 11 of the Potsdam Declaration.10 This article 
10. Text of Article 11 of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration: “Japan shall be permitted to maintain such 
industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not 
those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from 
control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade 
relations shall be permitted.”
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described how Japan’s economy would have to be allowed to revive before it 
could be expected to pay reparations and that eventually Japan should be allowed 
to freely engage in international trade. Dulles argued that while peace treaties 
should be “Carthaginian” in nature, there was also a need to think about the 
dignity and the equality of the defeated state in respect of the international com- 
munity. Dulles, after explaining his experience as a member of the US delegation 
to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, stated that because the Treaty of Versailles 
reflected both Wilson’s hopes and Clemenceau’s fears and hatred toward Germany, 
the Germans viewed the treaty as a humiliation, one that conversely gave rise to 
the Nazis. For Dulles the Treaty of Versailles was therefore a dangerous mix of 
both liberal and illiberal principles, and a precedent not to be followed.  
Dulles’s explanation for the conditions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was 
presented in a condensed format during the San Francisco Peace Conference in 
September 1951.11 First, President Truman had the following to say during his 
speech at the ceremony to mark the opening of the conference:   
There are other steps which need to be taken. The most important of these is the 
restoration of peace and security in Korea. With Japan returned to its place in the 
family of nations, and with the people of Korea secure, free, and united, it should 
be possible to find ways to settle other problems in the Pacific which now 
threaten the peace. (Truman 1951)
Truman’s remarks are important considering the power structure around the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty. Truman tied Korea’s security to Japan’s reentry into 
the international community. Truman sought a change in the Korean War 
through the signing of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty and the restoration 
of Japan’s sovereignty. In his speech, Truman explained that upon his orders 
Dulles had begun negotiations with each country’s government to conclude the 
peace treaty. He said that Dulles had displayed the “highest traditions of 
statesmanship” and completed his task “faithfully and well” (Truman 1951). 
Dulles followed Truman on the next day (September 5) with an explanation 
of the significance of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. He mentioned that Korea 
11. During Dulles’s April 1951 meeting with Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese delegation remarked 
that if Korea was a signatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, then Japan worried that “Koreans 
living in Japan would receive the right, as citizens of Allied country, to compensation and 
restoration of property as defined by the treaty” (Gaimushō 2007, 413-15). On July 19, ROK 
Ambassador to the US Yang Yuch’an appealed to the US government to participate in the peace 
conference as a signatory state. Yang insisted that there are many “Koreans in Japan,” but Dulles 
argued that they were from “North Korea” and were building up communism in Japan and could 
possibly take action against the government (“Memorandum of Conversation” 1951, 1202-206). 
Given the series of events, it is possible that Dulles’s remarks were influenced by Japan.
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had been “under Japanese control since 1905,” and made the distinction between 
“Korea” that appears in the San Francisco Peace Treaty from the “Republic of 
Korea.”
Article 21 makes special provision for Korea. The Republic of Korea will not sign 
the Treaty of Peace only because Korea was never at war with Japan. It tragically 
lost its independence long before this war began, and did not regain indepen- 
dence of Japan until after Japan surrendered. Many individual Koreans steadfastly 
fought Japan. But they were individuals, not recognized governments. (“John Foster 
Dulles’s Speech” 1951; emphasis added)
In the twenty-seven articles of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the word 
“Korea” appears three times. It appears twice in Article 2 of the treaty and a third 
time in Article 21, which states that “Korea [shall be entitled] to the benefits of 
Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.”12 Dulles exerted great influence by 
making the final decision on two critical articles which later became the cause 
of heated debates during the ROK-Japan normalization negotiations that began 
in 1951; namely Article 4, which dealt with “property claims,” and Article 14, 
which addressed the issue of reparations. The ROK was not granted permission 
to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and discussions regarding property 
claims between the ROK and Japan were to begin during the ROK-Japan 
negotiations. In the end, the question over the meaning of the contents of Article 
4 for Korean property claims became the biggest issue during the fourteen years 
of negotiations between the ROK and Japan (Kim Myongsob and Kim Soongbae 
2009).
From within Dulles’s speech the following passage described the current 
situation of Korea and the existence of North Korea:
Korea has a special claim on Allied consideration, the more so as it has not yet 
proved possible for the Allies to achieve their goal of a Korea which is free and 
independent. Korea is, unhappily, only half free and only half independent: and 
even that fractional freedom and independence has been cruelly mangled and 
menaced by armed aggression from the North. (“John Foster Dulles’s Speech” 
1951)
Here Dulles is pointing out that Korea is not a completely free and independent 
single country but a fragmented former state, within which the emergent freedom 
and independence of South Korea is being threatened by the North’s invasion. 
12. Article 2 refers to the territories of Japan, Article 4 to issues regarding property, Article 9 to 
issues regarding fishing, and Article 12 to trade relations. 
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This speech was given as the Korean War raged on, and Dulles here is calling 
international attention to the fact that the ROK was being attacked by North 
Korea.  
Next, this following passage from Dulles’s speech mentions the territorial 
relationship between Korea and Japan, and comments on the problem of property as 
it relates to the Japanese colonization of the peninsula.
Most of the Allied Powers have been seeking to make good their promise of 
freedom and independence and, as members of the United Nations, to suppress 
the aggression of which Korea is the victim. By this treaty, the Allies will obtain 
for Korea Japan’s formal recognition of Korea’s independence, and Japan’s consent 
to the vesting in the Republic of Korea, of the very considerable Japanese 
property in Korea. (“John Foster Dulles’s Speech” 1951)
In War or Peace, Dulles acknowledges that “South Korea” is the “only” “lawful 
government” (Dulles 1950, 47). In this speech, Dulles uses the official designation 
of the “Republic of Korea” but never uses North Korea’s official name—the 
“Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” 
As he continued to explain the significance of the treaty, Dulles, while admitting 
that discussions on reparations always accompany the conclusion of a peace 
treaty, said that the US had incurred a large economic burden in order to 
support the defeated Japanese. Ultimately, he hoped that Japan would no longer 
depend on the US and would become a self-reliant state. 
The difference between this 1951 accord and the historical peace treaties of 
the past was the perception of the ongoing threat of communism. Therefore, it is 
valid to argue that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, characterized by its exceptionally 
generous treatment of Japan, was an important foundation of the architecture of 
the Cold War order. The following passage from Dulles’s speech highlights that 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty originated against the backdrop of the Korean 
War—a conflict which was ignited by the Cold War struggle between the great 
powers of East and West and provided a brutal physical manifestation of the 
inherent danger that underlay their clash of ideologies.  
… if the treaty validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparation claims 
against Japan, her ordinary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her 
people would be destroyed and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit 
which would make them an easy prey to exploitation. Totalitarian demagogues 
would surely rise up to promise relief through renewed aggression with the help of 
those nearby who, as we have seen in Korea, are already disposed to be aggressors. 
(“John Foster Dulles’s Speech” 1951; emphasis added) 
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Here Dulles is connecting the issues of communism, security, reparations, 
and ROK-Japan relations. Large-scale immediate monetary reparations would 
make Japanese economic self-sufficiency difficult, and eventually this would 
impact the US economy as well. Additionally, economic difficulties in Japan 
would fuel support for totalitarian movements and “demagogues,” making the 
danger of Japan succumbing to communism more probable. The reparations 
issue was thus directly related by Dulles to the problem of the spread of 
communism, with the ongoing Korean War serving to illuminate the extent of 
this threat. In Dulles’s mind, the demands for strict reparations for Japan would 
simply turn the Japan of tomorrow into the Korea of today.   
However, Dulles, due to his dichotomic conception of war and peace, and 
liberal capitalism and communism, did not sufficiently reflect on the problematic 
nature of the recent Japanese control of the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, the 
role of Japanese colonialism in fomenting Korea’s contemporary war, by directly 
fomenting locally based communist resistance to capitalist inequality and 
exploitation at the hands of the Japanese colonists and their elite Korean col- 
laborators. It is possible to grasp Dulles’s alternative perception of colonialism as 
a benign force in Chapter 7 of War or Peace, entitled “Colonial Evolution vs. 
Violent Revolution.” In this, Dulles states his belief that, compared to the violent 
revolutions sought by the Soviet Union through propaganda and infiltration, 
individuals, based on their Christian faith, should promote the general good by 
constraining their desire for individual material interests. Dulles considered that 
Western colonialism was different from previous forms of colonialism in that it 
possessed a “self-liquidating feature” based on its economic, social, and specifically 
religious philosophical rationale. In short, his perception was that colonialism 
would sooner or later serve to spiritually and socially elevate and enlighten the 
colonized population to the degree where they could bloodlessly transition to 
self-rule. He therefore had a positive view of national trusteeship as regulated by 
the UN as he believed it also included this self-liquidating feature. This quality 
he saw as inherent to all governance based on Christian values (Dulles 1950, 
75-77). Although Dulles thought that many non-Western cultures and peoples 
had been devastated and destroyed because the colonial structure of the former 
Western empires strove towards materialistic ends, the laudable parallel between 
present day Western civilization and its former Imperial condition remained the 
positive influence of religion (87).     
62  KIM Soongbae
Conclusion
Relations between the ROK and Japan were normalized in 1965, and the current 
relationship between the two countries is referred to as “the 1965 system.” 
However, for the 1965 system to have come into existence as a realized concept 
in international relations, then the preceding “1948 system” and “1951 system” 
must also be explored. The importance of these preceding systems is indicated 
within the preamble of the Treaty on the Basic Relations between the Republic 
of Korea and Japan. This passage recalls the Resolution 195 (III) of the UN 
General Assembly adopted on December 12, 1948, and the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty signed on September 8, 1951, which provided a guarantee of international 
recognition to the ROK. What underlies the 1965 system is the birth of a 
sovereign state in 1948 and the confirmation of that sovereignty through the 
1951 Peace Treaty. As we have established here, Dulles was a major actor in both 
historic events.  
This understanding of Dulles’s contribution to the formation of post-war 
US-Japan relations and the drafting of the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not 
fully encompass the view that Dulles had a hand in creating the early Cold War 
relationship between the ROK and Japan. Dulles was a proponent of international 
recognition for the ROK at this moment of internal conflict across the Korean 
Peninsula. In this respect, while the wider Cold War certainly impacted the 
conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which sought to officially end the 
Pacific War and bring about a new peace, it was the “hot war” in Korea that 
hastened the birth of the accord. And it was Dulles in particular who projected 
the significance of the Korean War onto the San Francisco Peace Treaty.     
Dulles is known for his role in encouraging the practice of “pactomania,” 
diplomatically aligning the US with any and all friendly states during the 1950s, 
inspired by his fierce anti-communist convictions. His religious beliefs, as 
expressed in his book War or Peace, were also very influential in shaping Dulles’s 
approach to countering the threat of international communism. Essentially, 
Dulles believed in the inherent spiritual power of his Christian faith. This led 
him to the conclusion that these beliefs were a necessary and useful weapon to 
be used in confronting an extreme communist ideology which denied religious 
freedom. Dulles’s belief in the appositeness of the union between his religious 
and political concerns only deepened as the Cold War intensified. 
Following these spiritual and political convictions, Dulles’s role enabled him 
to deeply influence the regional order in East Asia. Following the rise of Maoism 
in China, Dulles mapped out a new pro-US Asian community centered on 
Japan. Although Dulles did not believe that Japanese society was imbued with 
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the Christian spirit, or likely to be so, he thought that the country’s popular and 
ancient religious traditions would help deny the advances of communism and 
enable a cooperative relationship with the US. While for Dulles Japan was now 
at the center of East Asia, he also appreciated the need to provide aid to the 
ROK as it was similarly aligned, and poised to develop as a client state within 
the US global political and economic order. His emphasis on the US playing the 
role of tutor or guardian within postwar East Asia harkened back to the foreign 
policy traditions of late-nineteenth century America. And, if we consider 
Dulles’s memories, experiences, and family relationships in conjunction with his 
writings, the links between his beliefs and this national tradition become easily 
apparent. 
However, Dulles’s Christian and anti-communist convictions were also 
grounded in a lack of introspection about colonialism. He failed to critically 
engage with the legacy of colonialism in his visions for global peace. Believing 
in the self-liquidating feature of Christianity and therefore colonialism in 
general, he was insensitive to the problems that the former colonies had suffered 
due to their subjugation by imperial powers. When considering how all these 
factors informed Dulles’s approach to the ROK and Japan, one might assume his 
combination of fervent anti-communist and Christian beliefs would have led 
him to strengthen US-ROK relations. However, his lack of critical concern with 
colonialism led him to favor the former empire of Japan rather than colonized 
Korea. This tendency toward Japan over Korea is illustrated by the outcome in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ultimately it should also be noted that Dulles’s 
beliefs about colonialism were not exceptional in post-1945 international 
politics, where many “unrepentant imperialist” perspectives were common in 
both the capitalist Western and communist Eastern blocs. 
Given Dulles’s contribution to ensuring the ROK’s international recognition 
as a sovereign state and the restitution of Japan’s sovereignty, his importance in 
the inception of the relations between the two sovereign states in the immediate 
postwar period cannot be overstated. Yet, Dulles promoted his brand of inter- 
national politics centered on war and peace without any concern for the legacy 
of colonialism. As the guardian and executioner of American foreign policy, he 
was therefore as responsible as anyone for the persistent projection of the legacy 
between colonizer and colonized onto “the future history” of ROK-Japan 
relations. 
• Translated by Benjamin A. ENGEL
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